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LOVING v. IRS: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT’S AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE TAX RETURN PREPARATION CONDUCT OF
COMMERCIAL RETURN PREPARERS
LAWRENCE B. GIBBS*
INDIVIDUAL taxpayers filed almost 143.6 million Federal Income Taxreturns in 2011.1  Paid preparers prepared a majority of these returns.2
Paid preparers fall into two categories: regulated preparers (including cer-
tified public accountants, attorneys, enrolled agents, and enrolled actua-
ries) and unregulated commercial preparers.  Regulated preparers
prepared almost 36 million individual returns in 2011; unregulated com-
mercial preparers, over 42 million returns.3  The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) has long and repeatedly exercised authority to regulate the tax re-
turn preparation conduct of regulated preparers.4  The District Court for
* Member of the law firm of Miller & Chevalier, Chartered in Washington,
D.C., and formerly Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1986–89).  Mr. Gibbs
wishes to thank his friend and colleague at Miller & Chevalier, Alan I. Horowitz,
for his assistance with this Article, the total responsibility for which, however,
remains with Mr. Gibbs.
1. IRS, DATA BOOK 2012 2 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/12databk.pdf.
2. See Nina E. Olson, More Than a ‘Mere’ Preparer: Loving and Return Prepara-
tion, 139 TAX NOTES 767, 769 n.14 (2013) (citing data from the IRS COMPLIANCE
DATA WAREHOUSE, INDIVIDUAL RETURNS TRANSACTION FILE AND RETURN PREPARERS
DATABASE from Tax Year 2011 to indicate that 78,088,554 returns—or more than
54% of the 143.6 million returns—were prepared by paid preparers).
3. See id.  According to Olson, the IRS data indicates that of the 78,088,554
returns prepared by paid preparers, 35,934,027 (or 46%) were prepared by regu-
lated preparers (attorneys, certified acceptance agents, certified public account-
ants, enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, enrolled retirement plan agents, and
state regulated preparers) and 42,154,527 (or 54%) were prepared by unregulated
commercial preparers (that Olson defines as “individuals with preparer tax identi-
fication numbers who did not list a profession when registering with the IRS”). See
id.
4. Circular 230 represents the authority by which the IRS has regulated the
conduct of tax practitioners for over ninety-two years. See Practice Before the In-
ternal Revenue Service, 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (1921).  For at least sixty-one years, Circu-
lar 230 has required practitioners to exercise due diligence in preparing or
assisting in the preparation of, approving, or filing tax returns. See id. § 10.22.  For
at least nineteen years, Circular 230 has precluded a practitioner from charging a
contingent fee for preparing an original tax return or for any tax advice rendered
in connection with a position taken or to be taken on an original tax return and
also has provided standards with respect to tax return positions and for preparing
and filing or signing returns. See T.D. 8545, 1994-2 C.B. 415, 419–20 (1994)
(amending sections 10.28 and 10.34 of Circular 230).  In addition, for at least
twenty-six years prior to the 2011 issuance of the regulations that are the subject of
the litigation in the Loving case, Circular 230 has contained a specific grant of
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the District of Columbia, in Loving v. IRS,5 held the IRS had no authority
to regulate such conduct of unregulated commercial preparers and en-
joined the IRS from enforcing the 2011 regulations that purported to do
so.6  For reasons I will explain, I respectfully disagree with the district
court’s holding and its analysis.  If the district court’s decision is affirmed
on appeal and the IRS is unable to regulate the conduct of unregulated
commercial tax return preparers, I believe Congress will see the need to
take steps to enable the IRS to do so.
The district court in Loving based its decision primarily on its analysis
of the language of the statutory authority that enables the IRS to regulate
the conduct of tax practitioners under Circular 230.7  The statutory au-
thority for Circular 230 is an 1884 statute, passed almost 130 years ago.8
The 1884 language was re-codified in 1982 as section 330 of title 31 of the
United States Code, but the legislative history makes it clear there was no
intention to change the meaning of the 1884 statute at the time of the
1982 re-codification.9
After reviewing the language of the original 1884 statute and that of
the 1982 re-codification, the district court in Loving held that Congress
intended to draw a bright line between the authority of the IRS to regulate
the conduct of tax practitioners who advise and assist taxpayers in prepar-
ing their tax returns to be filed with the IRS and the conduct of tax practi-
tioners who advise and assist taxpayers in dealing with the IRS on return-
related issues after the returns are filed.  The court held that the IRS has
authority to regulate the conduct of tax practitioners who defend posi-
tions taken in returns after the returns are filed, but the IRS has no au-
thority to regulate the conduct of unregulated commercial preparers who
prepare the returns taking such positions before the returns are filed.10
The 1884 statute was a rider on an annual appropriations bill to fund
the War Department.  The rider reflected congressional concerns about
the unscrupulous conduct of representatives that were soliciting, advising,
and assisting soldiers who were making claims against the Treasury Depart-
5. 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013).
6. Id. at 80–81 (“Defendants lack statutory authority to promulgate or enforce
the new regulatory scheme for ‘registered tax return preparers’ brought under
Circular 230 by 76 Fed. Reg. 32,286.”).  The Loving court then granted the plain-
tiffs’ request to “permanently enjoin Defendants from enforcing this IRS registra-
tion scheme against tax-return preparers.” Id. at 80. See generally 76 Fed. Reg.
32,286 (June 3, 2011) (regulating tax return preparation conduct of unregulated
commercial preparers).
7. See Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 74–75.
8. See Act of July 7, 1884, ch. 334, 23 Stat. 236, 258–59 (1884); see also Treas.
Dep’t Circular 230, 1921-4 C.B. 408 (1921) (citing aforementioned act).
9. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-651, at 19 (1982).
10. Loving, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 75, 79 (“Congress could well desire that those
who represent taxpayers in examinations or appeals be more closely regulated
than those who merely prepare returns. . . .  [T]he Court concludes that together
the statutory text and context unambiguously foreclose the IRS’s interpretation of
31 U.S.C. § 330.”).
2
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ment for compensation for back pay or for lost property after the Civil
War.  Specifically, Congress was worried about unreasonable fees being
charged to soldiers by the attorneys, claims agents, and other persons.
The 1884 rider gave the Secretary of the Treasury authority to prescribe
rules to regulate the conduct of representatives of the claimants before the
Treasury.11
The concerns expressed in passing the 1884 rider piqued my curiosity
because out of the 143.6 million individual income tax returns filed in
2011, about 80% involved claims by taxpayers for refunds.12  About 80% of
the annual returns prepared by paid preparers (regulated and unregu-
lated) in 2011 also involved refund claims.13  If Congress in 1884 was wor-
ried about regulating the conduct of those assisting claimants who were
pursuing Civil War claims against the Treasury, I was curious why the dis-
trict court in Loving felt that Congress, when it re-codified the law in 1982,
would be any less concerned about the IRS regulating the conduct of un-
regulated commercial preparers.  This interpretation seemed especially
noteworthy, given the fact that those commercial preparers sometimes
charged unreasonably high fees for incompetent or fraudulent tax advice,
resulting in excessively high refunds.14
I realized, of course, that about 20% of taxpayers annually file balance
due income tax returns instead of refund returns.  Over the last forty
years, the non-stop changes in, and the enormous complexity of, our tax
laws have driven more and more taxpayers to use preparers to assist them
in properly filing their returns.  Over the same period, tax shelters and
other overly aggressive tax planning transactions have made the IRS regu-
lation of return preparation much more important to deter tax non-com-
pliance.  These trends are well-known.  The point is that return preparers
can help taxpayers claim all the tax benefits to which they lawfully are
entitled, or return preparers can help taxpayers claim tax benefits to
which they are not entitled, regardless of whether taxpayers wind up get-
ting a refund or having to pay a balance due.  Therefore, although it is
easier to analogize today’s tax refund claims to the Civil War claims of the
11. See 48 CONG. REC. H5219-22 (1884) (discussing background of 1884
rider).
12. See Olson, supra note 2, at 776 n.78 (citing data from IRS COMPLIANCE
DATA WAREHOUSE, INDIVIDUAL RETURNS TRANSACTION FILE).
13. See id. at 776 n.79.
14. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae National Consumer Law Center and Na-
tional Community Tax Coalition in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Argu-
ing for Reversal of the District Court, Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(No. 13-5061), 2013 WL 1386247 (discussing concerns over incompetent and even
fraudulent conduct of some unregulated commercial tax return preparers); see also
id. (expressing concern about unreasonable tax preparation fees charged to tax-
payers by some commercial preparers); id. at 6 (“[L]ow-income consumers face tax
preparation fees that are already very high, and inflated, in many instances.  Mys-
tery shopper testing, discussed below, has documented preparation fees of $400 or
$500 in some cases.  Government enforcement actions also have revealed fees up
to $1,000 for as little as 15 minutes worth of work.”).
3
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nineteenth century, it was hard for me to believe a court would conclude
that Congress might intend to distinguish between the authority of the IRS
to regulate the conduct of tax return preparers depending upon whether
the returns they prepared were refund or balance due returns.
As I helped prepare an amicus brief of former IRS Commissioners
supporting the government’s position on appeal in the Loving case,15 I
reviewed the district court’s decision as well as the appellate briefs of the
various parties.16  I was impressed by the remarkable abilities of the district
court and the various advocates to carefully parse, and reach differing con-
clusions about, the meaning of statutory phrases in section 330 of title 31
of the United States Code.17  The statute in section 330(a)(1) gives the
Treasury the authority to “regulate the practice of representatives of per-
sons before the Department of the Treasury,” and section 330(a)(2)(D)
also gives the Treasury the authority to require the representatives to
demonstrate “competency to advise and assist persons in presenting their
cases.”18
The government in the Loving case found ambiguity in the scope of
the Treasury’s authority under section 330(a) because the phrase author-
izing the Treasury to “regulate the practice of representatives” did not de-
fine what constituted “the practice of representatives.”19  The district
court, however, found certainty in the scope of the Treasury’s authority
under section 330(a), because the district court interpreted the grant of
authority to “regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the
Department of the Treasury” in conjunction with the Treasury’s authority
to determine the representative’s “competency to advise and assist persons
15. See Brief Amici Curiae of Former Commissioners of Internal Revenue in
Support of Defendants-Appellants, Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(No. 13-5061) [hereinafter Brief of Former Commissioners], 2013 WL 1386248.
16. See Brief for Appellants, Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No
13-5061), 2013 WL 1282685; Reply Brief for Appellants, Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d
1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5061), 2013 WL 2446144; Brief for Appellees, Lov-
ing v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5061), 2013 WL 2146603; Brief
for Rhonda Gordon et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Loving
v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5061), 2013 WL 2285575.
17. 31 U.S.C. § 330(a) provides:
(a) Subject to section 500 of title 5, the Secretary of the Treasury may—
(1) regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the De-
partment of the Treasury; and




(C) necessary qualifications to enable the representative to pro-
vide to persons valuable service; and
(D) competency to advise and assist persons in presenting their
cases.
31 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2012).
18. Id. §§ 330(a)(1), 330(a)(2)(D).
19. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 37–42.
4
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in presenting their cases” to conclude that the Treasury’s authority was
limited to regulating the conduct of representatives who were actually ap-
pearing before the IRS to defend taxpayers’ positions before the IRS Ex-
amination and Appeals functions.20  Therefore, the district court
concluded that the preparation of tax returns by commercial preparers
did not involve either the presentation of taxpayers’ “cases” or the “prac-
tice of representatives” before Treasury.21
It is these specific conclusions of the district court with which I disa-
gree.  They seem to me to fail to properly apply the relevant statutory lan-
guage, legislative history, and congressional intent in light of the changes
that have occurred in the tax law, in tax administration, and in the repre-
sentation of taxpayers not only over the last 130 years but even over the
last thirty years since section 330 re-codified the original 1884 statute.
The conclusion that tax return preparers do not present taxpayers’
cases to the IRS when they prepare tax returns is simply not true, based on
my experience over the last fifty years.22  A return preparer presents a tax-
payer’s case each time the preparer makes specific decisions about how to
reflect the taxpayer’s income, deductions, exemptions, and credits on the
taxpayer’s return,23 or how to present tax benefits and the effects of tax
planning transactions in the return,24 or when and how to make disclo-
20. See Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74–75 (D.D.C. 2013).
21. See id.
22. A principal reason many, if not most, taxpayers use return preparers is to
obtain the benefit of an experienced professional who can advise the taxpayer
about how much tax must be paid, how such amount can legitimately be mini-
mized, how any tax risks can be minimized, and how the return can be prepared in
order to most effectively reflect the foregoing advice and assistance (i.e., to present
the taxpayer’s case).
23. See generally MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & ALAN W. SALTZMAN, IRS PROCEDURAL
FORMS AND ANALYSIS 4.06[10], [11] (2013).  Courts have advised on when and how
to report income items for which the taxpayer has received a Form 1099 from a
payor, or to reflect deductions for which the taxpayer has received a Form 1098
from a payee, in order to avoid or minimize adjustments that otherwise could be
triggered by innocuous differences in descriptions when the IRS matches the in-
come items reported to them by the payors, or the deduction items reported to the
IRS by the payees. See, e.g., Portillo v. Comm’r, 932 F.2d 1128, 1133–35 (5th Cir.
1991); Santa Maria v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1468, 1472–73 (1994); see also
I.R.C. § 6201(d) (2012); id. § 170(f)(8) (giving advice about whether to claim and
how to document deductions for cash charitable contributions in excess of $250);
id. § 170(f)(11)(A)(i) (discussing non-cash charitable contributions in excess of
$500); Treas. Reg. § 1.6695-2(b) (2011) (discussing how to minimize or avoid sub-
sequent IRS audits—or adjustments during such audits—of these items; and pro-
viding advice and assistance to low income taxpayers about whether and how to
appropriately claim, and to reflect such claim of, earned income tax credits to
minimize risk of later IRS adjustments).
24. Because of the inherent uncertainty and complexity of the tax laws and
because each taxpayer’s circumstances and appetite for tax risk may vary, the ex-
tent and type of the return preparer’s advice and assistance to taxpayers may vary,
as may the amounts and the presentation of the items of income, deductions, ex-
emptions, and credits reflected on each taxpayer’s return.  Knowing when and
how to use schedules and statements in a tax return to best and most effectively
5
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sures in tax returns to minimize or avoid penalties,25 or when and how to
file amended tax returns to correct errors in previously filed returns.26
These are just a few examples of the key roles played by return preparers
in presenting the cases of taxpayers to the IRS.27  Indeed, the failure of a
preparer to properly present a taxpayer’s case in the preparation of the
tax return can be grounds for malpractice.28
One of the biggest changes in the federal tax area during the last
twenty-five years has been the increasing number of socio-economic
spending programs that have been run through the Internal Revenue
Code.29  The economists have convinced the politicians that the most cost-
efficient way to deliver the benefits of these programs is through the use of
tax credits, many of them refundable credits.  Other former IRS Commis-
sioners and I, in helping to prepare our amicus brief to the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, decided to exemplify how tax return preparation en-
ables taxpayers to make their cases to qualify for and obtain refunds attrib-
utable to these tax credits.  The district court in Loving had concluded that
“[f]iling a tax return would never, in normal usage, be described as
‘presenting a case.’”30  The former Commissioners disagreed.  We ex-
plained refundable credits attributable to government assistance programs
being run through the Internal Revenue Code, such as assistance for low-
income families, health care, education, and homebuyers.31  We demon-
strated why and how preparing a tax return is the best means to enable a
taxpayer to qualify for the benefits under these programs and to obtain a
refund from the IRS.32  We argued that a preparer who advises and assists
a taxpayer to obtain these financial assistance benefits by preparing the
taxpayer’s return for that purpose is representing the taxpayer in making
present a taxpayer’s case to support the positions taken on these tax benefits in the
return is part of the art of tax return preparation.
25. See I.R.C. §§ 6662(a), (b)(2) (2012) (noting individual can be penalized
for substantial understatement of individual’s income tax liability, and amount of
such penalty can equal 20% or more of amount of understatement); see also id.
§ 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) (discussing how under certain circumstances proper disclo-
sure in individual taxpayer’s return may be sufficient to avoid the penalty).
26. See BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & KENNETH L. HARRIS, STAN-
DARDS OF TAX PRACTICE 120–30 (6th ed. 2004) (discussing various considerations a
preparer should take into account in advising taxpayers whether or not to prepare
and file an amended return).
27. For additional examples, see Olson, supra note 2, at 771–73.
28. See Paul J. Routh, Liabilities of Tax Preparers: An Overview, 13 CAP. U. L. REV.
479, 517–19 (1984) (discussing theories in tort and contract law under which re-
turn preparers may be held liable for failing to properly advise and assist taxpayers
in preparing their tax returns).
29. See Lawrence B. Gibbs, Great Plains Federal Tax Institute: 50th Anniversary
Dinner in Omaha, Nebraska on November 29, 2012, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 139, 144–47
(2013).
30. Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 74 (D.D.C. 2013).
31. See Brief of Former Commissioners, supra note 15, at 3–7.
32. See id. at 7–9.
6
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the taxpayer’s case to the IRS, which qualifies the preparer as a “represen-
tative” within the meaning of section 330.33
The term, “representative,” has become a focal point for the plaintiffs
and some of the commentators who have weighed in on the district court’s
decision in Loving.34  They have pointed to dictionary definitions of “rep-
resentative” as an agent who “stands for or acts on behalf of another.”35
They have insisted that a preparer cannot qualify as a representative of a
taxpayer because the preparer can never act as an agent for the taxpayer
to sign the taxpayer’s return on the taxpayer’s behalf.  Therefore, they
argue, preparers cannot be “representatives of persons before the . . .
Treasury” within the meaning of section 330(a).36  I have no quarrel with
the definition of a representative as someone who acts on behalf of an-
other, but I disagree that the preparer must act as the agent for the tax-
payer in a principal-agent relationship in order to be considered a
“representative” for purposes of section 330(a).  Let me explain why I disa-
gree by comparing an attorney’s preparation of a will for a client with a
preparer’s preparation of a tax return for a taxpayer.
The client could prepare his or her own will, but because of the im-
portance of the will and the complexities involved, clients often choose to
use an attorney to prepare their wills.  The attorney reviews, among other
things, the client’s assets and liabilities and determines the client’s objec-
tives at the time of the client’s death.  Then the attorney advises the client
about ways to accomplish the client’s objectives, including ways to lawfully
minimize taxes payable at the client’s death.  Once the attorney under-
stands the client’s objectives, the attorney prepares the will on the client’s
behalf to reflect the client’s choices and to accomplish the client’s objec-
tives.  The client must sign the will because signing the will is a non-delega-
ble duty of the client.
Similarly, a taxpayer could prepare his or her own income tax return,
but because of the importance and complexities involved, many taxpayers
choose to use a preparer to prepare their returns.  The preparer reviews
the taxpayer’s income, expenses, and other circumstances and determines
the taxpayer’s objectives in filing the return.  Then the preparer advises
the taxpayer about ways to accomplish the taxpayer’s objectives, including
ways to either minimize the tax payable or obtain a refund.  Once the
preparer understands the taxpayer’s objectives, the preparer prepares the
return on the taxpayer’s behalf to reflect the taxpayer’s choices and to
accomplish the taxpayer’s objectives.  The taxpayer must sign the return
because signing the return is a non-delegable duty of the taxpayer.
33. See id. at 12–16.
34. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 16, at 37; see also Bryan T. Camp, ‘Lov-
ing’ Return Preparation Regulation, 140 TAX NOTES 457, 466–68 (2013); Steve R.
Johnson, Loving and Legitimacy: IRS Regulation of Tax Return Preparation, 59 VILL. L.
REV. 515, 547–52 (2014).
35. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 16, at 37 n.23.
36. See id.
7
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Surely, the attorney is reasonably viewed as having represented the
client in advising, assisting, and preparing the client’s will on the client’s
behalf, and I submit that the preparer also may be reasonably viewed as
having represented the taxpayer in advising, assisting, and preparing the
taxpayer’s income tax return on the taxpayer’s behalf.  No principal-agent
relationship was established because none was needed to enable the repre-
sentation to occur.
Finally, in recognition of the importance of the tax return preparer in
the presentation of the taxpayer’s case in the tax return, the IRS now spe-
cifically permits taxpayers on the face of the Form 1040 income tax return
to express a desire, when the return is filed, for the preparer to continue
to represent the taxpayer before the IRS after the return is filed with re-
gard to the information provided on the tax return.37  Importantly, the
most recent data available from the IRS indicates that more than two-
thirds of the taxpayers who use return preparers authorize their preparers
to continue to represent them before the IRS to discuss any questions that
the IRS may raise about the return information during the processing of
the return by the IRS.38  The large number of commercial preparer re-
turns containing preparer authorizations suggests that substantially all un-
regulated commercial return preparers are authorized by at least some, if
not many, of their clients to represent the clients before the IRS after the
returns are filed with the IRS.39
37. See IRS Individual Income Tax Return Forms 1040, 1040A, & 1040EZ
(2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/Forms-&-Pubs.  On page two of Forms
1040, 1040A, and 1040EZ respectively, right above the line for the taxpayer’s signa-
ture, each taxpayer may check a “Yes” box and provide a preparer’s name, tele-
phone number, and personal identification number in order to authorize the
preparer to “discuss this return with the IRS.” Id.  The instructions to the Form
1040 state: “If you check the ‘Yes’ box, you, and your spouse if filing a joint return,
are authorizing the IRS to call the designee to answer any questions that may arise
during the processing of your return.” IRS, Line Instructions for Form 1040 (2012),
http://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1040/ar01.html#d0e1681 (last visited Apr. 16,
2014).
38. For the tax year 2010, taxpayers filing 81,107,021 individual income tax
returns authorized 57,491,941 paid preparers (regulated and unregulated) to act
on their behalf before the IRS during the processing of the returns after the re-
turns were filed with the IRS. See IRS, 2010 ESTIMATED DATA LINES COUNTS INDIVID-
UAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 15 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/
10inlinecount.pdf.  Although taxpayers are permitted to designate family mem-
bers, friends, or others to act on their behalf, I understand from my discussions
with the IRS that substantially all of the authorizations are believed to be preparer
related.  Therefore, it would appear that between 66.6% and 71% of the paid-
preparer returns contain such authorizations.
39. It has been estimated that 600,000 to 700,000 unregulated commercial
preparers are affected by the provisions of the 2011 regulations. See Brief for Ap-
pellees, supra note 16, at 13–14 (“The IRS originally estimated that 600,000 to
700,000 tax preparers would be subject to this licensing scheme.”).  Assuming that
almost 44 million returns were prepared by unregulated commercial preparers in
2010 (i.e., by applying the 54% from Olson to the 81,107,021 returns prepared by
paid preparers to determine the approximate number of returns prepared by un-
regulated commercial preparers in 2010), and assuming that two-thirds of the 44
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss3/3
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR303.txt unknown Seq: 9 14-AUG-14 14:34
2014] LOVING AND COMMERCIAL RETURN PREPARERS 511
Bearing all of the foregoing in mind, it is hard to believe the Treasury
in 1884 would have concluded that anyone advising and assisting a claim-
ant in the preparation and submission of a Civil War claim would be ex-
empt from regulation simply because the representative did not make an
actual appearance before the Treasury, especially if the representative un-
scrupulously collected a fee to pursue the claim and then failed or refused
to follow up with the Treasury after the initial claim was filed.  On the
other hand, if the representative did such a good job in preparing and
submitting the claim that the Treasury paid the claim, as submitted and
without requiring any actual appearance, it would seem strange that any-
one would suggest that the representative had not represented the claim-
ant before the Treasury in obtaining the compensatory payment.40
I see no difference between such a situation in 1884 and a situation
today, in which a preparer advises and assists a taxpayer with regard to the
information to be provided on an income tax return concerning the
amount of income to be reported and the tax benefits in the form of per-
sonal exemptions, deductions, and credits to be claimed, which either re-
sult in a refund or reduce the balance due that the taxpayer must pay.
When a preparer reflects such advice in the manner in which the preparer
presents these tax items in the taxpayer’s return and when, on the face of
the return, the preparer identifies himself or herself by name, address,
telephone number, and PIN number as the person who has represented
the taxpayer in preparing the return, knowing the return will be filed with
the IRS, I submit that all of these combined actions should be sufficient to
cause the preparer to be considered as being engaged “in the practice of
representing persons before the Department of the Treasury,” within the
meaning of the provisions of section 330(a).
If, in addition, the taxpayer authorizes the IRS to discuss with the
preparer on the taxpayer’s behalf any questions the IRS may have about
the information in the return after it is filed, I submit that not only has the
preparer represented the taxpayer in presenting the taxpayer’s initial case
to the IRS in the tax return but also, because of the specific authorization
million returns contained preparer authorizations, the result would be that, in
more than 29 million returns prepared by unregulated commercial preparers, tax-
payers authorized such preparers to act on their behalf before the IRS during the
processing of the returns after the returns are filed. See Olson, supra note 2, at 769
n.14.  That would result in, on average, about forty-one to forty-eight returns pre-
pared by each unregulated commercial tax return preparer that contained such
preparer authorizations.
40. The legislative history to the 1884 statute makes reference to “applica-
tions” to be submitted by claimants to the Treasury Department. See 48 CONG. REC.
H5219 (1884) (clerk’s statement of proposed legislation) (“This act shall apply to
pending as well as all future applications for allowance of claims for lost horses,
bounty, and arrears of pay.”).  Although there are references in the legislative his-
tory of the 1884 statute and in the related literature to appearances before the
Treasury as a characteristic activity of claimants and their advisors, I have been
unable to find anything that suggests that a personal appearance by a claimant or a
claimant’s representative before the Treasury was actually required.
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made by the taxpayer, the preparer has made an initial appearance, on
behalf of the taxpayer, before the IRS to answer questions and, if neces-
sary, to explain and defend the accuracy of the return information when
the IRS processes the return after it is filed.41  Therefore, such actions
should be sufficient under the 1884 statute and under section 330 to en-
able a court to conclude that the promulgation by the IRS of the 2011
regulations under Circular 230 to regulate the return preparation conduct
of previously unregulated commercial preparers constituted an authorized
regulation of “the practice of representatives of persons before the Depart-
ment of the Treasury.”42
That a return preparer is so authorized to represent a taxpayer in
dealing with the IRS during the processing of the taxpayer’s return by the
IRS is significant.  The IRS National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson, in
her excellent recent article has provided a detailed description of the
many different ways the IRS may engage a return preparer in adversarial
discussions about the accuracy of the taxpayer’s return during the time
the IRS is processing a taxpayer’s return and before the IRS Examination
function opens a formal audit of the return.43  For example, section
41. See Rev. Proc. 81–38, 1981–2 C.B. 592 (1981) (noting there is little or no
substantive legal difference between authorization by taxpayer on page two of
Form 1040 tax return for preparer to represent taxpayer before the IRS during the
processing of tax return and later authorization by taxpayer in power of attorney
for preparer to represent taxpayer in IRS audit of tax return); see also 31 C.F.R.
§ 10.3(f)(3) (2011); 76 Fed. Reg. 32,286 (June 3, 2011) (codified as amended at 31
C.F.R. pt. 10).
42. The plaintiffs in the Loving case have made a variety of other arguments to
the contrary in their appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
They have argued that the attempted regulation of the conduct of commercial tax
return preparers in the 2011 regulations either conflicts with or renders superflu-
ous other specific statutes in the IRC. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 16, at
39–50.  The IRS’s response has been that these other statutes were enacted for
different purposes and are not inconsistent with the authority of the IRS under
Circular 230 to regulate commercial return preparers. See Reply Brief for Appel-
lants, supra note 16, at 16–23.  The plaintiffs also argue that prior statements by the
IRS to the effect that the IRS lacked the authority to regulate the conduct of com-
mercial return preparers are inconsistent with and undercut the authority asserted
by the IRS in the 2011 regulations. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 16, at 57–58.
The IRS response has been that these prior statements were either legally incorrect
or were policy statements made before the IRS decided to exercise its authority to
regulate such conduct. See Reply Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 27–30.  As
Professor Bryan Camp has explained at length, the relevant IRS policies in this
area have changed greatly over the last ninety-two years since Circular 230 was
initially promulgated, as the role and importance of tax return preparers have
changed. See Camp, supra note 34, at 457–66.  Finally, the plaintiffs have argued
that various congressional proposals to authorize the IRS to regulate commercial
return preparers indicate that Congress did not believe it previously had granted
the IRS authority to regulate commercial preparers. See Brief for Appellees, supra
note 16, at 55–57.  The IRS response has been to rely on the authority cited by the
Loving district court in refusing to base its holding in any way on such failures and
on other authority to the same effect. See Reply Brief for Appellants, supra note 16,
at 26–27.
43. See Olson, supra note 2, at 773–75.
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6213(g) provides the IRS with authority to summarily assess tax with re-
spect to certain tax return related items that the IRS considers to be erro-
neous.44  The IRS document matching program—under which the IRS
matches Forms 1099 received from certain third-party payors with
amounts to be reported as income on taxpayer-payees’ returns—has led to
litigation in which courts have upheld the right of the taxpayer-payee to
overcome the presumption of correctness that normally attaches to
amounts reflected on the payor’s Form 1099.45  There have been reports
that the IRS is using its authority under section 6213(g) to summarily as-
sess tax on income reported by a payor on a Form 1099 that is not re-
ported on a taxpayer-payee’s return.46  The advice and assistance of the
return preparer with respect to such income items during the return prep-
aration process and during the processing of a taxpayer’s return can be
important to minimize the time and expense of extended administrative
hassles with the IRS and to avoid litigation in these situations.
In any event, based upon the analysis, arguments, and interpretations
presented above, I submit that the meaning of the key statutory phrase of
section 330(a), “the practice of representatives of persons before the De-
partment of the Treasury,” is fairly susceptible to more than one interpre-
tation and, therefore, is ambiguous.  Any such ambiguity would appear to
make the government’s position and argument in the Loving case credible
and persuasive.  The government on appeal in the Loving case has argued
that:
Under Chevron, unless Congress has spoken to the precise issue
presented, an agency’s regulation is valid if the regulation fills a
statutory gap, or defines a term, in a reasonable fashion.  “If a
statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construc-
tion is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the
agency’s construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading
differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpre-
tation.”  As demonstrated below, the critical statutory term in 31
U.S.C. § 330(a)(1), i.e., “practice of representatives of persons
before the Department of the Treasury” is ambiguous and there-
44. See I.R.C. § 6213(g) (2012).
45. See, e.g., Portillo v. Comm’r, 932 F.2d 1128, 1133–35 (5th Cir. 1991); Santa
Maria v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1468, 1472–73 (1994); see also I.R.C.
§ 6201(d).
46. See Amy S. Elliott, Practitioners to Challenge IRS for ‘Overreaching’ with Math
Error Exception, 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 19-3 (2011).  A preparer may be able to
persuade the IRS not to make an erroneous assessment if the IRS contacts the
preparer by telephone before making the assessment.  If an assessment already has
been made, the preparer may request an abatement of the assessment pursuant to
the provisions of section 6404(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. See Olson,
supra note 2, at 773 (“For the 2012 filing season, the IRS issued 2,042,458 math
error notices for individual returns.  About 10 percent of the amounts assessed
were later abated.” (footnote omitted)).
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fore is a proper subject for interpretation by the Secretary of the
Treasury.47
The district court in the Loving case rejected the government’s above
argument on the basis that the plain meaning of the words in the critical
phrase of section 330(a)(1), “practice of representatives of persons before
the Department of the Treasury,” was clear and unambiguous.  Based on
my above analysis, I respectfully submit that the meaning of the words in
the critical phrase is fairly susceptible to more than one interpretation and
therefore is unclear and ambiguous.  For that reason, I believe the 2011
regulations of the Treasury regulating the tax return preparation conduct
of commercial preparers are authoritative and should be upheld.
47. Brief for Appellants, supra note 16, at 29 (quoting Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005); 31 U.S.C.
§ 330(a)(1) (2012)).
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